RT Journal Article SR Electronic T1 Results on GNSS Spoofing Mitigation Using Multiple Receivers JF NAVIGATION: Journal of the Institute of Navigation JO NAVIGATION FD Institute of Navigation SP navi.510 DO 10.33012/navi.510 VO 69 IS 1 A1 Niklas Stenberg A1 Erik Axell A1 Jouni Rantakokko, A1 Gustaf Hendeby YR 2022 UL https://navi.ion.org/content/69/1/navi.510.abstract AB GNSS receivers are vulnerable to spoofing attacks in which false satellite signals deceive receivers to compute false position and/or time estimates. This work derives and evaluates algorithms that perform spoofing mitigation by utilizing double differences of pseudorange or carrier phase measurements from multiple receivers. The algorithms identify pseudorange and carrier-phase measurements originating from spoofing signals, and omit these from the position and time computation. The algorithms are evaluated with simulated and live-sky meaconing attacks. The simulated spoofing attacks show that mitigation using pseudoranges is possible in these tests when the receivers are separated by five meters or more. At 20 meters, the pseudorange algorithm correctly authenticates six out of seven pseudoranges within 30 seconds in the same simulator tests. Using carrier phase allows mitigation with shorter distances between receivers, but requires better time synchronization between the receivers. Evaluations with live-sky meaconing attacks show the validity of the proposed mitigation algorithms.